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Abstract 
We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be 
a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is 
established in a multi-task principal-agent model, capturing that cooperatives are not 
publicly listed and their CEOs have to bring the downstream enterprise to value as well 
as to serve upstream member interests. Not having a public listing prevents the CEO from 
choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. Cooperatives are uniquely 
efficient when the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the 
strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product. 
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„These figures suggest that cooperatives tend to operate in the low value-added, first-
stage food manufacturing industries.‟ 
Cook, 1995, p1154 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Some researchers doubt the efficiency of cooperatives and argue that cooperatives suffer 
from a host of problems unique to this specific form of governance. Stewart (1993) even 
asserts that a business cannot be successfully run if its customers or suppliers are deeply 
involved in running it because there is too much conflict of interest. Yet, cooperatives 
and investor owned firms (IOFs) coexist in many sectors of most modern economies and 
compete for market share, especially in the agricultural sector where cooperatives have 
played an active role for a very long time in many countries (Hansmann, 1996).  
 
A cooperative is an enterprise collectively owned by many independent farmers as input 
suppliers in a production chain. The members own collectively a joint resource where 
they either further process or market their produce. They delegate certain rights to the 
cooperative enterprise. Subsequently, the cooperative enterprise concludes contracts with 
members, specifying for example delivery requirements. The vertical ties between the 
members and the processor therefore consist of a transaction element and an ownership 
element. In contrast, an IOF processor is a firm owned by outside investors and it has 
merely a transactional relationship with its input suppliers. 
 
An important agent in bringing an enterprise to value is the CEO (Chief Executive 
Officer). This is reflected in the massive amount of research focusing on what guides 
CEO behavior (see for example Babchuk and Fried, 2003). An important part of the 
research attention is executive compensation because it can help in rectifying the agency 
problem between the CEO and the owner(s). The relationship between the principal and 
the agent differs between a cooperative and an IOF. The situation in cooperatives is most 
likely more complex than a standard principal-agent relationship in an IOF. First, the 
tasks of a cooperative CEO consist of more dimensions due to the „cooperative‟s goal of 
jointly maximizing member and cooperative returns‟ (Peterson and Anderson, 1996, 
p376). Members are users in addition to owners of the firm. They have at least two sets of 
concerns: owner concerns and user concerns. Owner concerns revolve around the security 
and overall profitability of their investments in the cooperative. User concerns include 
issues of the pricing and quality of product and services, which influence the profitability 
of their individual farm enterprise (Staatz, 1987). These two concerns are reflected in the 
members‟ expectation regarding the management.  
 
Second, the incentive contract of a CEO is based on a performance measurement system, 
creating incentives that align the goal of the agent with that of the organization. However, 
there are no simple indicators of cooperative managerial performance or automatic 
incentive systems (such as stock options) to close the gap in interests. Giving a CEO 
equity in the business, a common way to tie the CEO‟s wealth to firm performance and 
thus to alleviate the interests conflict in IOFs, is uncommon in cooperatives. There are 
several reasons. One reason is that an (outside) cooperative CEO is not eligible to hold 
 3 
equity in the business. Another reason is that a CEO would receive only limited benefits 
from such ownership given the fact that most cooperatives respond to the absence of a 
public listing by adopting a conservative valuation method regarding the collective 
capital, resulting in the cooperative stock hardly appreciating in value (Trechter et al., 
1997). Given these additional complexities in cooperatives, designing a contract ensuring 
the mutual compatibility of a cooperative‟s goals and the CEO‟s incentives has to be even 
more difficult.  
 
These observations inspire the following questions: What is the impact of the absence of 
public listing and the dual role of members in a cooperative on the behavior of the CEO? 
When is a cooperative (with its member ownership and its lack of public listing) uniquely 
efficient? These questions will be addressed by incorporating the above distinctions 
between cooperatives and IOFs in a multi-task principal-agent model. We specify an 
upstream and a downstream activity, their interdependency, and a performance measure 
for the CEO capturing the difference in public listing between the two governance 
structures. This allows us to determine the circumstances when a cooperative is the 
unique efficient governance structure.
2
 
 
We position our article in four ways. First, most studies regarding contract choice in 
agrarian economics using the principal-agent model are geared to the relationship 
between a landowner and a farmer (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993). We address the 
relationship between farmers and the CEO of a cooperative. Second, Fulton and Hueth 
(2009) indicate that cooperative conversions, failures, and restructurings are often due to 
poor management, next to lack of capital, property rights problems and portfolio 
problems. They observe regarding cases „that were identified as having poor management 
were also identified as having significant agency problems‟. This article addresses on the 
one hand these agency problems by analyzing the impact of the performance 
measurement scheme on managerial performance, and on the other hand identifies the 
sectors in which cooperatives are most likely to be successful.  A third way to position 
the article is that a variety of corporate forms has to be considered when studying the 
nature of the firm (Hansmann, 1996). A cooperative is from this perspective an 
informative counterfactual for the much studied publicly-listed corporation. To be more 
specific, a cooperative has various special features which distinguish it from other 
governance structures. One of the objectives of research regarding cooperatives is to 
show that these features may actually be desirable, despite the widespread belief that they 
are not. In this article we demonstrate that the absence of a public listing, often believed 
as a disadvantage of cooperatives, can make a cooperative uniquely efficient. Finally, 
issues regarding the governance of enterprises are often distinguished into income and 
decision rights (Hansmann, 1996). Income rights address the question „How are benefits 
and costs allocated?‟, i.e. they specify the rights to receive the benefits, and obligations to 
pay the costs, that are associated with the use of an asset. Decision rights in the form of 
authority and responsibility address the question „Who has authority or control?‟, i.e. they 
concern all rights and rules regarding the deployment and use of assets. This article is 
about income rights, whereas Hendrikse and Veerman (2001a, 2001b) are about decision 
                                                                        
2
 This article is not the first to identify these circumstances. We like to mention Bontems and Fulton 
(2009), Hendrikse (1998), Hendrikse and Veerman (2001a, 2001b), and Sexton (1986).  
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rights. It entails implicitly that the ownership role is subordinate to the user / patron role 
in this article. 
 
The next section presents the model. Section 3 identifies the efficient governance 
structure. The strategic choice of performance measure is addressed in section 4. 
Conclusions and research directions are formulated in the final section. 
 
2 Model 
 
A multi-task principal-agent model (Gibbons, 1998) is developed to capture governance 
structure differences between cooperatives and IOFs. The model consists of a two-stage 
non-cooperative game. In the first stage, the principal (i.e. the owner) chooses the 
strength of incentives while the agent (i.e., the CEO)‟s optimal choice of activities is 
determined in the second stage of the game. Assume that a CEO can take two actions, 
Da and Ua . First, denote Da  as the CEO‟s action to advance the value of the downstream 
firm. Examples are setting long-term goals, establishing policies and standards, 
determining long-term financing needs and sources, and setting strategies (Blanchard et 
al, 1996). According to Merchant (1990), CEOs allocates their time over eight categories 
of activities: 1) new product development, 2) improvement of existing products/services, 
3) adjusting/improving production processes, 4) employee development, 5) capacity 
expansion, 6) improvement of information systems, 7) execution of current production 
processes, and 8) advertising and sales promotion.  
 
Second, denote Ua  as the action adding value to the upstream suppliers. In addition to the 
activities mentioned above, a cooperative CEO needs to take actions that create value for 
the upstream members because of the user-owner feature of cooperatives. Three extra 
categories are specified. The first category is improvement of member involvement and 
member loyalty. Compared with his IOF counterpart, the cooperative CEO is more 
interdependent and interactive when coping with the user-owners. As a leader of a 
community-based organization, he needs to be particularly effective in fostering group 
cohesiveness, a key component in improving member loyalty. The second category is 
vertical information exchange. A cooperative CEO once informed us that he spent at least 
half of his time communicating with member patrons. Members have different 
preferences as to price, cost allocation, and equity retirement polices, which affect both 
the cooperative and the member enterprises. They have more formal and informal 
channels to communicate their desires to the CEO than do patrons of an IOF and thus are 
able to exercise cheaper “voice” (Staatz, 1987). Meanwhile, a cooperative CEO must 
actively acquire useful information in discovering the optimal choice (Cook, 1994). The 
third category is member coordination and improvement of member relations. A 
cooperative CEO takes a more integrated view of the members‟ fixed costs when 
attempting to optimize the vaguely defined objective function of the firm. The more 
heterogeneous the membership, the more will be the difficulty for the CEO to form 
consensus and viable internal coalitions. The CEOs, particularly those of large, 
diversified cooperatives, need to spend considerable time and effort in negotiating and 
meeting the expectation of members. They are required to reduce the increasingly 
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heterogeneous interests to more homogeneous interests to capture the benefits of 
coordination (Cook, 1994). 
 
The CEO‟s total contribution to firm value is denoted by y. Denote the marginal product 
of action 
Ua  and Da by Uf  and Df . The production function is U U D Dy f a f a    , 
where  is a stochastic variable with expected value of zero, representing the noise in the 
production process that is beyond the agent‟s control. Given the difficulty in measuring 
the exact overall effect of the CEO‟s actions on firm value, no compensation contract 
based on y can be enforced in court. Therefore, an alternative performance measure p 
becomes necessary. Suppose the technology of performance measurement takes the form 
g a g aU U D Dp    , where ,U Dg g  denote the performance measurement parameter, i.e., 
the weight attached to ,U Da a , and   denotes the noise in performance measurement with 
expected value of zero. Suppose the compensation contract specifies the wage w paid to 
the CEO as a linear function of p, i.e. w s bp  , where s stands for the salary and b for 
the bonus rate. The principal‟s payoff is the difference between the CEO‟s total 
contribution to firm value and the wage paid: y w   . The CEO‟s payoff is the 
difference between the wage received and the cost of the actions taken: ( , )U DU w c a a  . 
Assume that the cost function is 
2 2
( , )
2 2
U D
U D U D
a a
c a a ka a   , where -1<k<1 (Dixit, 
2002). The parameter k captures interdependencies between the upstream and 
downstream activities in the production chain. There are no interdependencies when k=0. 
When 0<k<1, the two tasks are substitutes, i.e., more effort in Ua  increases the marginal 
cost of effort in Da , therefore enhancing the marginal incentive payment for greater 
output of Ua draws effort away from Da .  Examples of substitutable tasks are the time 
spent by a CEO in communicating with the input suppliers and the time spent on the 
business strategies of the firm. When the workload of the CEO is fixed, the more he 
works with the suppliers, the less time is left to spend on the strategies. When -1<k<0, the 
two tasks are complements, implying that the interaction between the two tasks 
strengthens incentives for both.
3
 An example of complementary tasks is the CEO‟s 
coordination role between the suppliers and the enterprise. Well known is the matching 
problem regarding sugar beets between the delivery of each farmer‟s harvest and the 
capacity of the processing plant. A farmer likes to deliver his harvest immediately to the 
processor, while the processor likes to spread the deliveries in order to reduce the 
idleness of the plant. More knowledge of one side facilitates coordination with the other 
side. 
 
Differences between a cooperative and an IOF are reflected in their restrictions on the 
parameters in the production function and performance measure. First, a CEO‟s 
contribution to firm value depends on the organizational form. In cooperatives, it is 
equivalent to the change in total member value. Members want to bring both upstream 
farms and the downstream cooperative to value, i.e., 0, 0U Df f  . Investors of an IOF 
                                                                        
2 The cost function is superadditive when k<0. 
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processor care only about the value of the firm and consequently the CEO‟s action that 
increases firm value, i.e., 0, 0U Df f  . Second, the performance measures of IOFs and 
cooperatives differ. It is not unusual in IOFs that the CEO‟s bonus is paid in the form of 
firm shares, i.e., 0Dg  . The CEO of an IOF processor will of course not be rewarded 
based on a performance measure taking upstream activities into account, i.e. 0Ug  . 
Cooperatives lack a public listing. They are therefore not able to pay the CEO with shares 
reflecting the value of the downstream enterprise. We capture this observation by 
assuming 0Dg   in a cooperative.
4
 However, member interests are usually present in the 
incentive scheme for a cooperative CEO, e.g. by benchmarking the transfer price and 
production volume. This is reflected in our assumption that 0Ug   in cooperatives. 
Notice that these assumptions regarding the parameters in the performance measure 
scheme of the cooperative reflects that members are prioritized rather than the 
downstream activities, which is of course popular with members, especially those who 
are close to retirement. 
 
To summarize, cooperative members‟ plurality of interests is represented by 0Uf  , 
while the absence of patron-members, and therefore serving their interests, in an IOF is 
represented by 0Ug  .  The absence of public listing of a cooperative is embodied by 
0Dg  , while the use of the stock price in an IOF‟s performance measure is captured by 
0Dg  . The distinct features of both governance structures are presented in table 1. Our 
specifications imply implicitly, except for these zeros, that the parameters in the 
production function and the performance measure remain the same across different 
governance structures.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
3 Efficient governance structure 
 
We use backward induction to solve the game. We start therefore in the second stage of 
the game in order to determine the equilibrium level of tasks chosen by the CEO. 
Subsequently we determine in stage one the equilibrium bonus rate. The CEO‟s optimal 
action is determined by maximizing his expected utility, i.e.,
,
max ( )
U Da a
E U , where 
2 2
( ) [ ( , )] (g a g a ) ( )
2 2
U D
U D U U D D U D
a a
E U E w c a a s b ka a        .  
 
Setting the first derivative of the expected utility function with respect to 
Ua , Da  equal to 
                                                                        
3 We are not stating that a cooperative has no information at all about the downstream activities, but our 
model will focus on the impact of lacking certain information. 
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zero results in the first order conditions U
U
c
bg
a



and D
D
c
bg
a



. This characterizes 
the CEO‟s optimal actions * ( )Ua b and 
* ( )Da b . 
 
The payoff-maximizing reply in the second stage of the game is anticipated in the first 
stage when the principal chooses *b . *b  is determined by maximizing the expected total 
surplus, that is, max ( )
b
E U  ,  where  
* * * *( ) [ ( , )] ( , )U D U U D D U DE U E y c a a f a f a c a a       . 
 
The specification of the two governance structures in table 1 is used to determine the 
equilibrium results. The efficient bonus rate for a cooperative is *
( )U D
U
f kf
b
g

 . The 
cooperative CEO‟s equilibrium actions are *
2
( )
1
U D
D
k f kf
a
k
 


 and *
21
U D
U
f kf
a
k



. The 
total surplus is
2
2
( )
2(1 )
U Df kf
k


.  Similarly, the efficient bonus rate for an IOF is 
* /D Db f g and the optimal actions of a downstream IOF CEO are, 
*
21
D
D
f
a
k


 and 
*
21
D
U
kf
a
k



. The surplus generated is 
2
22(1 )
Df
k
. 
 
A cooperative has to be compared with another governance structure in order to 
determine when it is efficient. One possibility is to focus on the misalignment between 
the performance measure and the production function (coefficients) by comparing a 
cooperative with an IOF (with a different value of the performance measurement 
parameter regarding the upstream activities). This is done by Gibbons (1998), but the 
importance of chain interdependencies is not reflected in such a comparison. Another 
possibility is to highlight that a cooperative consists of the upstream farmers and the 
downstream processor. Value is added at both stages of production by the cooperative. 
We capture this by comparing the surplus created by a cooperative with the joint surplus 
created by two independent IOFs, one upstream farmer and one downstream processor. 
We introduce therefore an upstream IOF farmer, with 0, 0, 0, 0D U D Uf f g g    .  The 
equilibrium results for the upstream IOF are * /U Ub f g , 
*
21
U
D
kf
a
k



, and *
21
U
U
f
a
k


. 
The surplus generated is 
2
22(1 )
Uf
k
. 
 
3.1 No interdependency, i.e. k=0 
 
If k=0, the equilibrium results of the cooperative and the upstream IOF are identical, i.e., 
* /U Ub f g ,
* 0Da  ,
*
U Ua f . The equilibrium results of the downstream IOF are 
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* /D Db f g  ,
*
D Da f , 
* 0Ua  . In equilibrium, the CEO of the downstream IOF has 
incentives to undertake only Da , because the investors care only about Da   and make the 
CEO‟s pay dependent only on Da . Members of cooperatives, however, appreciate the 
CEO‟s actions on both dimensions but only compensate for Ua . Thus, only an incentive 
to increase Ua is created and no incentive for Da  exists even though it would increase 
firm value. The appearance of Da  in the production function does not have any impact on 
the efficient bonus rate and subsequently on the CEO‟s equilibrium actions because it is 
not acknowledged in the performance measure. Consequently, the behavior of the 
cooperative CEO is exactly the same as the behavior of the CEO of the upstream IOF. 
When an action increases the member value without simultaneously increasing the 
performance measure, the CEO has no incentives to undertake it. 
 
Straightforward calculations show that the total surplus of the cooperative, the upstream 
and downstream IOF are 2
1
2
Uf , 
21
2
Uf  and 
21
2
Df respectively. The total surplus created by 
a cooperative is identical to the surplus generated by an upstream IOF and is always less 
than the surplus created by the two IOFs, i.e. the cooperative is inefficient. Value would 
be created in the cooperative by developing downstream activities because 0Df  , but 
the cooperative CEO will not choose these activities because the performance measure 
does not put any weight on them. The difference in value creation between the two 
governance structures is therefore equal to the value created at the downstream IOF. This 
result is summarized in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: A cooperative is inefficient when k=0. 
 
Another way to explain this result is that the cooperative is supposed to serve member 
interests and to generate maximum value in processing. However, the organizational 
structures required for the upstream and downstream tasks differ. The cooperative is 
designed for the former task, and therefore does not always perform the latter task well. 
The governance structure IOF consists of two separate entities, i.e. a downstream and an 
upstream IOF. It is tailored to each task separately. Section 3.2 will show that this result 
hinges on the assumption that the upstream and downstream activities are independent.  
 
3.2 Tasks are complements / substitutes, i.e. -1<k<0 / 0<k<1 
 
As shown in the beginning of the section, Ua for the downstream IOF and Da  for the 
upstream IOF and the cooperative are not zero anymore in equilibrium if the tasks are 
substitutes or complements. Their actual levels will depend on the nature and the strength 
of the interaction effects.  
 
The CEO of the downstream IOF will optimally choose to take more actions advancing 
the downstream value as compared with the case where k=0, regardless the nature of the 
interaction between tasks. If Ua  can make Da  less costly, he will take some actions Ua in 
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order to decrease the marginal cost of Da , which will in turn increase 
*
Da . A stronger 
complementarity effect results in a larger *
21
D
D
f
a
k


 and *
21
D
U
kf
a
k



, i.e., more actions 
will be taken at both the upstream and downstream stage. If Ua  makes Da  more costly, 
then a negative action on Ua will be taken since it will decrease the marginal cost of 
action Da , and therefore 
*
Da  increases. Similarly, the CEO of the upstream IOF will 
optimally choose to take more actions advancing the upstream value when his tasks are 
interdependent. 
 
When two actions are complements, a cooperative CEO will optimally choose a positive 
level of Da , which in turn increases the equilibrium level of Ua  as compared with the 
case when k=0. A stronger complementarity effect results in higher levels of *Da  and 
*
Ua . 
A high bonus rate will result in a high level of *Ua , which will result in a higher 
*
Da  due to 
the complementarity effect. Therefore, a principal valuing both actions has incentives to 
increase the bonus rate in order to increase both actions. The stronger is the 
complementarity effect, the larger is the efficient bonus rate. When the two tasks are 
substitutes, a high bonus rate drives the cooperative CEO to exert as much effort as 
possible to Ua  while taking no action or even negative action on Da . Therefore, the 
principal will cut down the bonus rate. The efficient bonus rate will be smaller when the 
substitution effect is stronger.  
 
We have shown earlier that the total surplus of a cooperative and two IOFs 
are
2
2
( )
2(1 )
U Df kf
k


, 
2
22(1 )
Df
k
and
2
22(1 )
Uf
k
respectively if tasks are substitutes or 
complements. The comparison of the total surplus of the cooperative with the total 
surplus of the two IOFs is straightforward. It results in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: A cooperative is uniquely efficient if and only if 
2
2
1
D U
k
f f
k



. 
   
Interactions between the downstream and upstream activities may make the cooperative 
the unique efficient governance structure. These interactions in the cost function elicit 
new activities by the CEOs, i.e., the cooperative CEO will choose a positive level of the 
downstream activities, downstream activities are chosen also by the CEO at the upstream 
IOF, and upstream activities are put forward by the CEO at the downstream IOF. It turns 
out that the equilibrium level of upstream activities generated by the cooperative is 
identical to the level of upstream activities by the two IOFs together, while the level of 
downstream activities generated by the cooperative is lower than the level of downstream 
activities by the two IOFs together. Total output in a cooperative is therefore lower than 
in the IOFs. However, the decrease in total costs in a cooperative is even larger when the 
complementarities are sufficiently strong. The reason is that the decrease in the 
downstream activities by the cooperative CEO is limited due to 0Uf  . This makes the 
cooperative the unique efficient governance structure, despite that the downstream 
 10 
activities are not recognized in the CEO‟s compensation scheme. The cooperative 
internalizes externalities to a certain extent by putting positive weight on serving member 
interests and generating maximum value in processing. Not having a public listing 
provides the cooperative with a commitment not to choose the level of the downstream 
activities too high. Proposition 2 also indicates that the cooperative is never efficient 
when the downstream and upstream activities are substitutes or independent. 
 
Proposition 2 may also be interpreted in terms of a tradeoff between a measurement 
problem and a chain interdependency. In each IOF (upstream or downstream), there is no 
measurement problem and thus no agency cost since we have only one action which is 
valued in terms of revenues. This raises the question of the optimality of vertical 
separation versus vertical integration. Define the total surplus of the two separate IOFs as  
2 2
22(1 )
s U Df fW
k



, where the subscript S means „Separation‟. Consider an integrated firm 
with no measurement problem, i.e. the f- and g-vector are completely aligned. Define the 
total surplus of this integrated firm as ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )U DW y c a a   with 2ˆ 1
i i
i
f kf
a
k



 for i=U,D and 
,
ˆ ˆ
i i
i U D
y f a

  . It follows that 2ˆ 1
s U Dkf fW W
k
 

. It is immediate that separation can only be 
optimal when actions are cost substitutes and never when actions are cost complements. 
 
Now, if the integrated firm is a cooperative so that a measurement problem appears by 
definition, we already know that a cooperative yields a lower surplus than the 
corresponding efficient firm, i.e. 
2
2
( )
2(1 )
coop U Df kfW
k



< Wˆ . The feature that 
1
ˆlim coopk W W  entails that the agency cost due to the measurement problem in the 
cooperative becomes negligible when k is approaching -1. But as shown by proposition 2, 
a cooperative is more efficient than two separated IOFs if and only if k is sufficiently 
negative, i.e. if and only if the agency cost of the cooperative is sufficiently small. Hence, 
when k is negative, there is a tradeoff between having potentially optimal integration but 
at an agency cost and having no agency cost but suboptimal separation between 
producing units.   
 
Proposition 2 provides at least two indications where cooperatives are to be expected. 
First, cooperatives are expected in sectors where the marginal productivity at the 
downstream stage is below a certain level, which depends on the strength of the 
complementarities and the marginal productivity at the upstream stage of production. 
This is in line with the opening citation of this article. Second, the incidence of 
cooperatives varies between countries and over time. Hansmann (1999, p387) observes 
„More generally and more strikingly, the overall share of economic activity accounted for 
by cooperatives is larger in advanced economies than it is in less-developed economies. 
And, more striking still, the market share of cooperatives in economic activity has grown 
throughout the 20
th
 century.‟ One development in the advanced economies is the rise of 
ICT, and its applications in the management of supply chains. Improving the coordination 
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in supply chains entails an increase in the importance of chain complementarities, i.e. a 
decrease in the level of the chain interdependencies parameter k in our model. The 
inequality in proposition 2 indicates that cooperatives are the efficient organizational 
form in more sectors of the economy when the strength of chain complementarities 
increases. 
 
4 Strategic choice of performance measure 
 
This section argues that there may be a strategic rationale involved in the choice of the 
performance measure parameters. Strategic as well as efficiency considerations may 
determine the weights in the performance measure to establish alignment with the 
production function parameters. An early contribution is Vickers (1985). Notice that to 
study strategic performance measurement choice, there need to be (potential) competition 
between enterprises, i.e., there have to be at least two enterprises. 
 
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), three variables have to be specified in order 
to determine the payoff maximizing choice of performance measure in a strategic setting: 
the nature of the investment, the nature of the competitive process, and the entry 
condition. First, define the investment as the extent of member focus in the performance 
measure. If the extent of member focus is large, i.e., 2g  is much higher than 1g , then the 
profits of the rival firm will increase. The reason is that the CEO will dedicate a larger 
part of his time to activities related to the interests of members when the extent of 
member focus changes from small (S) to large (L), which goes at the expense of activities 
geared towards developing the cooperative enterprise. It entails that the investment is soft, 
because it establishes a positive relationship between investment in the weight of member 
focus in the performance measure and profits of the rival firm. Second, assume that the 
nature of the competitive process is characterized by strategic substitutes, i.e. reaction 
functions are downward sloping (figure 1). Third, two cases regarding the possibilities of 
market entry have to be distinguished (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984): entry is inevitable or 
it is not. If entry is not inevitable, then a monopoly market structure arises endogenously 
by the choices of the two enterprises. Otherwise it is always a duopoly. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
The profit maximizing investment profile of the cooperative is to be aggressive in order 
to elicit a passive response by the rival, i.e. underinvestment in the weight put on member 
focus in the performance measure. Notice that in a setting with strategic substitutes no 
distinction has to be made regarding the entry condition. The payoff maximizing 
investment choice is the same in both cases regarding the entry condition because the 
market is characterized by a soft investment and strategic substitutes. This result is 
summarized in proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: A cooperative puts a low weight on member focus in its performance 
measure in order to elicit passive behavior from a rival enterprise. 
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5 Conclusions and further research 
 
This article has developed a multi-task principal-agent model in order to address the 
effects of interdependencies between upstream and downstream activities and strategic 
performance measure choice. It is established that the interdependency between upstream 
and downstream activities is a possible source to make the cooperative the unique 
efficient governance structure. A necessary requirement for the efficiency of the 
cooperative is that this interdependency is a chain complementarity, and that it has to be 
above a certain level. This level is increasing in the ratio of the downstream and upstream 
marginal product, i.e. the chain complementarities have to be stronger when the 
downstream marginal product increases relative to the upstream marginal product. It 
entails that cooperatives are efficient only in sectors where the downstream marginal 
product is below a certain level, given the level of the upstream marginal product and the 
strength of the chain complementarities. 
 
It is encouraging that the results are established in a highly stylized model. It provides a 
start for developing additional arguments for the widespread occurrence of cooperatives. 
One obvious possibility for further research is to relax the assumption that cooperatives 
have no information available regarding downstream activities to incorporate in the 
performance measure scheme of the CEO, e.g. accounting data or subjective performance 
measures. Relaxing this assumption may identify additional circumstances when the 
cooperative is an efficient governance structure. 
 
Second, Trechter et al. (1997) is right that the CEO is important for the success of a 
cooperative. However, enterprises have a variety of means to address coordination and 
motivation problems, of which CEO compensation is one. Other instruments have 
therefore to be considered in combination with CEO compensation. For example, further 
research may incorporate additional internal control mechanism in cooperatives. The 
board of directors is usually elected by and from the membership, and is commonly 
representing member interests. It has more access to information inside the organization 
and have more at stake in the cooperative than their counterparts in IOFs have, and are 
thus expected to be a more active monitor and participant. 
 
Third, the principal-agent model embodies various assumptions which are questioned by 
practitioners. For example, the model posits that the principal is in a very powerful 
position because he determines the details of the contract, while the agent decides 
subsequently regarding acceptance of the contract and the level of activities. It seems that 
the model allocates too much power to the principal, i.e. the members. In reality the CEO 
has often substantial power due to his superior information regarding final product 
markets and the details of similar compensation packages for his position (Hendrikse, 
2007). He is therefore in a position to propose his own compensation package, while the 
board representing the members only can decide to accept or reject the compensation 
proposal. So, there seems to be a skewed power relationship between the board and the 
CEO in favor of the CEO. A related observation is that many researchers today think that 
there are problems associated with the vaguely defined property rights in cooperatives. 
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Future research has to determine how our results are influenced by the degree of CEO 
power. 
 
Fourth, our results can be related to growth and innovation of cooperatives versus IOFs. 
The nonmarketability of cooperative equity implies different attitudes towards growth 
between cooperatives and IOFs. Growth is the single most important determinant of stock 
price (Holmström, 1999). The growth of an IOF results in appreciation of equity, which 
can be realized by investors through selling their shares in the secondary market. An IOF 
CEO has thus incentives to accelerate the firm growth when his own pay and tenure are 
strongly tied to the stock price (Lerman and Parliament, 1991). The nonmarketability of 
cooperative equity, on the other hand, provides no incentives for the cooperative CEO to 
pursue firm growth. This is in line with our results predicting that the cooperative CEO 
spends less effort to advance downstream value, leading to slower growth in cooperative 
enterprises than in IOFs.  
 
There are also differences to be expected regarding upstream versus downstream 
innovation. Upstream innovation mainly concerns the process innovation related to the 
existing products while the downstream innovation concerns development of new 
products. Cooperatives, according to many, are at a disadvantage in the innovation race 
with IOFs. For instance, Thirkell (1989) claims that cooperatives are generally not 
innovative or progressive. Given the discussion in previous sections, the emphasis of a 
cooperative on upstream member benefits entails that the process innovation in members‟ 
close interests is not necessarily ineffective or inactive as compared with that in an IOF. 
A cooperative normally only processes (or markets) the products from its members, and 
this makes product-orientation a characteristic of the cooperative business form. 
Furthermore, the fact that members have expertise and will bring new ideas about their 
products will strengthen the cooperative‟s search for product related differentiation. 
Based on our results we expect that the cooperatives focus more on upstream innovation 
with regard to the existing products than on the development of new products 
downstream. Empirical research has to shed light on these claims. 
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 Table 1: Marginal product and performance measure parameters of different 
governance structures 
 
 IOF Cooperative 
Marginal product 
downstream 
Df  Df  
Marginal product  
upstream 
0 
Uf  
Performance measure 
downstream 
Dg  0 
Performance measure 
upstream 
0 
Ug  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Performance measure choice and reaction functions 
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